Abstract. One of the main problems of modern navigation both manned and unmanned transport systems is a problem of transport safety. To improve the accuracy of transport positioning used Differential GNSS technology, which is based on setting a fixed referent station with a known position XYZ. Unfortunately, GNSS is vulnerable to malicious intrusion with the help of cyber-attacks as Jamming and Spoofing. GNSS signals and/or correction signals of DGNSS referent station can be jammed and/or spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. How can the rover receiver (i. e., the user) be sure that the information they receive is authentic? Spoofing is the transmission of matched-GNSS-signal-structure and/or signals of referent station interference in an attempt to commandeer the tracking loops of a victim receiver and thereby manipulate the receiver's timing or navigation solution. A spoofer can transmit its counterfeit signals from a stand-off distance of several hundred meters, or it can be co-located with its victim. In this article we consider the principles of spoofing detection using mainly Differential GNSS, in which a correction signals of referent station uses for detection of spoofing.
Introduction
Marine environments present some of the most challenging positioning conditions in the world -raging currents, rugged coastlines, narrow passageways and high winds. Modern satellite navigation is based on the use of no-request range measurements between navigational satellite and the user. It means that the information about the satellite's coordinates given to the user, is included into navigation signal. The way of range measurements is based on the calculation of the receiving signal time delay compared with the signals, generated by the users equipment [1] .
Satellite based positioning provides the world's most precise location information. It is possible to acquire positioning anywhere in the world that GNSS satellite signals are available, any time of day, at data rates up to 100 Hz. Measurements can be generated in real time or processed postmission to achieve the highest level of accuracy.
GNSS technology is most frequently used to:
• determine the location of an object on or with respect to the Earth for navigation; • locate an object with respect to another object for tracking purposes. Positioning information typically provided includes a horizontal domain (latitude/longitude or easting/northing) and a vertical domain (height).
To improve the accuracy of transport positioning used Differential GNSS technology, which is based on setting a fixed referent station with a known position XYZ. For example, Oceanix 1 provides accurate GNSS corrections to enable sub-decimetre positioning for marine hydrographic survey, dredging, mapping, coastal patrolling and other non-oil and gas marine applications. The high rate corrections broadcast enables carrier phase ambiguity resolution within the GNSS receiver, greatly enhancing the accuracy and speeding recovery from GNSS signal interruptions.
Oceanix Nearshore correction service delivers exceptional sub-decimetre positioning for diverse marine applications including dredging, hydrographic survey and mapping. The high-rate corrections broadcast enables carrier phase ambiguity resolution within the GNSS receiver, greatly enhancing the accuracy and speeding recovery from GNSS signal interruptions. Oceanix includes precise GNSS clock and orbit correction data providing high accuracy: 4 cm horizontal and 6 cm vertical. 2 Ibid.
OCEANIX Sat1

GNSS Sat1
GNSS Sat2
GNSS Sat3
2017, VOL. 1, № 1
Evgeny Ochin | GNSS and DGNSS Spoofing Detection
Sometimes you do not need to know your precise position but you do need to know your position or an object's position, relative to another object or location. GNSS relative positioning solutions 3 are used to: • determine where an object is located on earth with respect to another object's location; • determine the horizontal and vertical distances between one object to another object (the horizontal and vertical distances can also be referred to as baseline lengths, displacements, relative separations or offsets between the two objects). Applications requiring relative GNSS positioning include:
• landing systems such as helicopter to aircraft carrier;
• railway collision avoidance systems;
• autonomous in air refueling;
• safety systems where a device beep increases in volume as you approach another object or location; • automated ship docking systems.
Main definitions:
• GNSS -Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS: www.
glonass-iac.ru, GPS: www.navcen.uscg.gov, BEIDOU: en.beidou. gov.cn, GALILEO: www.gsc-europa. eu, QZSS: www.qzs.jp/en/services).
• DGNSS -Differential GNSS.
• Sat i i N N , , , = і 1 4 -the navigation satellites as the space part of GNSS. {In ideal case, when the measurements are precise and satellite time is identical with the user's equipment time the users positioning can be realized with 3 satellites. Actually satellites time differs from the time on the users equipment. So, for users positioning one more coordinate is necessary -time drift between users equipment and the satellite time. That's why four satellites are needed for the solving of navigation problem.} • Almanac is a package of ephemeris of all the satellites belong to global navigation system.
• Ephemeris -a coordinates package, which uniquely determine the satellites position and velocity.
• DS -Differential Station -control correction station subsystem differential GNSS, including a Reference Station with their own coordinates ( , , ) x y z rs rs rs and the Radio Beacon transmitting correction information.
• Spoofing -attack on GNSS, which is trying to deceive the GNSS receiver, transmitting the powerful false signals that mimic the signals from GNSS and exceeding the power of true signals from GNSS.
• Spoofer -complex computer and radio equipment for the implementation of GNSS spoofing.
• Rover -any mobile GNSS receiver that is used to collect data in the field at an unknown location.
• Pseudo-range -distance to the satellite, resulting in the receiver based on the correlation of the received code and on-board code without correction of clock synchronization errors. • ( , , )
-the calculated coordinates of the vehicle using the GNSS.
• ( , , )
-the calculated coordinates of the vehicle using the DGNSS.
x y z rs rs rs -the coordinates of RS.
• 
GNSS and DGNSS Positioning
The distance from vehicle ( Fig. 2) to satellites Sat i can be written as
4 If the vehicle is 2D vehicle (ship, vessel, boat, car, etc.), the height coordinate (z) can be omitted and minimum number of navigation satellites can be reduced to three and timing errors on board Dt , which are used to correct the clock GNSS navigation (this article is not consider the timing errors Dt ) 5 . The positioning error may be defined as
on condition that the real coordinates of the vehicle x y z , , ( ) known since the geodesic (centimeter) accuracy. Analyzing the problem of positioning accuracy (2), we note that
that is, the accuracy is largely determined by the size of the propagation time delay from the Sat i to the vehicle DT i v � . Support for GNSS Positioning technology will solve the problem of positioning in the meter range (5-10 m). Currently, to improve the accuracy of GNSS are widely used the differential GNSS.
 2.1. Differential GNSS Positioning
In order to increase the accuracy of GNSS to a level that provides swimming ships in rivers and canals, was developed differential subsystem DGNSS [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , consisting of ground differential base stations that receive signals from satellites, counting errors for signals about its (actual) position in the system WGS84 and transmit errors by a special radio network or by satellite. Correcting Reed-Solomon codes are used for error-correcting coding. DGNSS are divided into three categories (Fig. 3) . 
We calculate the assessment of the distance from RS ( 
Local Area Differential GNSS 
Regional Area Differential GNSS DGNSS
Wide Area
In this case the system of the equations (2) assumes the form
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of equations (10) and calculate the position of the vehicle ( , , )
. The positioning error may be defined as
on condition that the real coordinates of the vehicle (x, y, z) known since the geodesic accuracy. The support for Differential GNSS positioning technology will solve the positioning problem in high-accuracy (10-20 cm).
 2.3. Regional Area DGNSS Positioning
Let's pretend that Regional Area Differential GNSS comprises from M Reference Station ( , ,
We calculate the assessment of the distance from RS j to satellites Sat i (pseudo-ranges) by determining the signal propagation time from RS to the satellites Sat i as
The 
In this case the system of the equations (14) assumes the form
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of equations (16) and calculate the position of the vehicle ( , , ) 
where For example, there are base stations in the territory of the Polish Republic in the ASG-EUPOS system (Fig. 6 ). Fig. 6 . Distribution of ASG-EUPOS reference stations (with kind permission from Bujakowski-Surveyor General of Poland) 6 In Fig. 7 you can see the coverage area of the territory of the Polish Republic by the correction field.
 2.4. Maritime Wide Area DGNSS Positioning
A network of reference stations is the base unit which provides high precision coordinate-time information about the location of vessels in coastal waters 7 . This network is organized in areas where the density of traffic and the existing navigation and hydrographic support of navigation safety are demanding higher levels of courts in order to protect the environment and re-duce downtime of vessels and to achieve smooth operation of the fleet, providing quality rescue at sea. (Table 2) .
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where
In practice, the task of 2D interpolation on a non-uniform grid can be solved using standard software procedures, such as MATLAB -a two-dimensional interpolation on the irregular grid:
Syntax: ZI = griddata (x, y, z, XI, YI) Description: Function ZI = griddata (x, y, z, XI, YI) returns an array of ZI, which is defined on the new grid {XI, YI} as a result of interpolation of the initial function z, defined on a nonuniform grid {x, y} i. e. z f x y
Two examples of the task solutions of 2D interpolation on a nonuniform grid for 13 RS 9 (a) and for 8 RS 10 (b), located in {14 ≤ E ≤ 15; 54 ≤ N ≤ 55} (Fig. 9) . As Z used the sum of two fields (random and deterministic) (Table 2) and we use procedure griddata as and we use procedure griddata (Fig. 11) . 
Moving DGNSS Positioning
One drawback of Differential GNSS is that the installation of Differential Station requires a significant investment in the geodetic reference. In the case of rapid deployment of Differential GNSS can be used Moving Differential GNSS (Fig. 12) .
Basic data GNSS (N height and width of the space E) are clustered around a central point (Fig. 13) . 14,56338 14,56358 14,56378 14,56398 14,56418
The exact coordinates N = 53,429732 E = 14,563658 (Fig. 14) and the estimates for the coordinates N for I = 1 200 , (Fig. 15) . In this example for measurements E we have 200 samples of E i (Fig. 16) and the estimates for the coordinates E for I = 1 200 , (Fig. 17) . 
The arithmetic means of geographic coordinates of moving BS (  N I and  E I ) are clustered around a central point (Fig. 18) . The exact coordinates N = 53,429732, E = 14,563658 Comparing fi gures 13 and 18 we can conclude that with the technology of the moving BS we can be arranged Moving DGNSS with an acceptable accuracy for many applications. Selecting I depends on the requirements of positioning accuracy BS, which increases with increasing I.
GNSS and DGNSS Spoofing
 3. 1 
. GNSS Spoofi ng
The spoofer can be built on the basis of laboratory GNSS signal generator designed for debugging GNSS receivers. Spoofi ng is possible to build a system based on a particular set of SDR (Software-defi ned radio -soft-ware-defined radio), for they have the appropriate software. Approximate cost is 1-10 thousand euro. A victim moves in space with the civil GNSS procedure and is subjected to an spoofing attack from other vehicles on the ground or at sea, which will called "spoofer". GNSS spoofing is the GNSS signal conversion technology. Spoofer plans to organize an attack, so that the navigator should not know that the signal received by GNSS receiver is false. As a result of an organized attack, the navigator determines wrong time and/or location. This means that the spoofer began to administer the GNSS position in time and space.
The distortion of the signal includes a signal capture and playback at the same frequency with a slight shift in time and with greater intensity, in order to deceive the electronic equipment of a victim and, respectively, co-driver, of course, if there is one on board the vehicle. The only GNSS system switch can't be deceive, are GNSS military systems, that utilizes principles of cryptography. However, for GNSS civil use such protection doesn't exist. Therefore, the research of spoofing property for anti-spoofers design must be conducted. The spoofing main idea is illustrated in Fig. 9 . Spoofer is generally located in the immediate vicinity of the victim and moves in space with civilian or military GNSS mode (L1 or L1/L2).
Spoofer performs short-term disruption of the GNSS signal L1 using GNSS jammer. As a result of jamming GNSS receiver "loses satellites" and starts looking for GNSS signals. At this time, spoofer includes imitator GNSS signals, which is set up to imitate the new coordinates of the GNSS receiver. Generally, GNSS signal strength exceeds the strength of imitator real GNSS signals and GNSS receiver can't determine from what time of its movement in space it is controlled by a spoofer. 
, , .
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of equations (22) and calculate the false position of the victim ( , , ) 
GNSS and DGNSS Spoofing Detection  4.1. Spoofing Detection of Local Area DGNSS Positioning
The navigation processor of victim solves the system of the equations (26) [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum positioning error DD max on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not available), i. e. 
D Ј
In this case we can make the system of the equations 
It then computes the distance between the two vehicle positions
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum positioning error DD max on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not avail- 
We calculate r  i bs
by analogy with sections "Differential GNSS Positioning" and "Spoofing Detection using Differential GNSS" and then we can compute the distance between the two vehicle positions ( , )
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum positioning error DD max on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not avail- T w -window of the average.
This means that with a frequency 1 / Dt there is a sliding updated estimates � � E N , ( ) in a time window T w . 
� � .
D ЈD
Summary and conclusions
The risk of losing GNSS signal is growing every day. The accessories for the manufacture of systems GNSS "Jamming and/or Spoofing" are now widely available and it can take advantage of not only military, but also terrorists. The distortion of the signal includes a signal capture and playback at the same frequency with a slight shift in time and with greater intensity, in order to deceive the electronic equipment of a victim and, respectively, codriver, of course, if there is one on board the vehicle. The price of one chipset of such equipment is in the range of 1-10 thousand euros, depending on the dimensions and weight parameters. The principles of spoofing detection of local, regional and wide DGNSS, in which a correction signals of differential station uses for spoofing and for detection of spoofing are constantly evolving. But this methods has one obvious drawback -is supposed to use a fixed (stationary) differential GNSS station. Our many years of research in the field of spoofing detection [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] give us confidence that this deficiency is avoidable thanks implement mobile differential station, including floating.
